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INTRODUCTION 
This appeal presented two questions: whether the 
trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment and whether the court below erred in denying 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. While this Court was 
of the opinion that the trial court acted properly in denying 
the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, it did acknowledge 
that the theory under which plaintiff sought recovery was an 
appropriate basis for relief in the proper circumstances. It 
is respectfully submitted that where the Court erred was in 
failing to recognize that under the Court's holding with regard 
to the doctrine of reasonable expectations, the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment required resolution of a factual 
issue which was never presented to nor decided by the 
factfinder and which is inappropriate for summary disposition. 
ARGUMENT 
THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF AN INSURED 
IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHICH CANNOT BE 
RESOLVED BY AN APPELLATE COURT ON REVIEW OF 
THE GRANT OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This Court misperceived one of the issues presented on 
appeal and failed to apply the proper standard of review in 
connection with the trial court's granting of a motion for 
summary judgment. The court below ruled, as a matter of law, 
that the express words of the insurance policy in question had 
to control the interpretation of the parties' agreement. This 
Court, .however, held that contract terms which are "against the 
reasonable expectations of the parties may be found void in the 
appropriate circumstances." Slip. Op. at 5. This Court 
further acknowledged that to determine the reasonable 
expectations of the insured one must examine "extrinsic matters 
such as the intent of the parties, the purpose sought to be 
accomplished, the subject matter of the contract, and 
circumstances surrounding the issuance of the policy." Slip. 
Op. at 6. 
It has been uniformly acknowledged that where 
interpretation of a written instrument turns 
on the acceptance of extrinsic evidence, the 
process of weighing such evidence should be 
for the trier of fact. 
Hausam v. Wodrich, 574 P.2d 805, 809 (Alas. 1978). As noted in 
the Restatement of Contracts 2d, § 212 comment e (1981), "if 
the issue depends on evidence outside the writing, and the 
possible inferences are conflicting, the choice is for the 
trier of fact." 
In the instant case, Mr. Wagner purchased 
"underinsurance" coverage, not just uninsured motorist coverage, 
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which he was told could be used as a "supplement to [an 
underinsured's] bodily injury insurance. . . . " Depo. of 
Cal Coleman at p. 15. Mrs. Wagner has alleged that she and her 
husband had a reasonable expectation that such coverage would 
protect them if one of them was injured by the negligence of an 
underinsured driver. The defendant moved for summary judgment 
on the grounds that Utah didn't recognize the reasonable 
expectations doctrine and the trial court agreed* It is 
inappropriate for this Court to acknowledge, on the one hand, 
that Utah does recognize the doctrine, and then on the other to 
affirm the Court as though it had made a factual ruling on that 
issue, which it did not. 
Where a trial court has based its ruling on 
a misunderstanding of the law, or might have 
done so, and a correct application would 
have produced a different result, the party 
adversely affected is entitled to have the 
matter readjudicated under correct principle 
of law. 
Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410, 420-21 
(Utah 1983). 
It is important to remember that this case was decided 
while in its infancy. Only one deposition was taken before 
defendant sought judgment on the sole basis that under the 
terms of the policy "uninsured motorist coverage is excluded by 
the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle which does not 
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include an automobile owned by or furnished or available for 
the regular use of an insured or any family member." 
Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment at p. 1. This 
Court/ having found that the reasonable expectations of the 
insured can operate to preclude enforcement of the express 
terms of the policy and that extrinsic evidence is required to 
resolve this question, should not preclude the development and 
presentation of such extrinsic evidence to the factfinder by 
affirming a grant of summary judgment on a ground which was not 
argued to the trial court. To do so would be to deny the 
plaintiff the right to present her evidence on an issue of fact 
which has not heretofore been decided by the trier of fact and 
to substitute the judgment of this Court for that of the trier 
of fact on a factual issue. 
The Court treated this appeal as though the case had 
been fully resolved on the basis of stipulated facts. This is 
not correct. While the parties did not dispute the evidence in 
the record, a material dispute certainly existed regarding the 
ultimate fact, Mr. Wagner's reasonable expectations. The 
defendant offered no evidence on this question, it merely 
asserted that it was immaterial because the express language of 
the contract was controlling as a matter of law. Having 
determined that Mr. Wagner's reasonable expectations are 
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material to the resolution of this case, this Court should 
remand to the District Court for presentation of evidence on 
this question to the factfinder* 
In moving for summary judgment, the defendant did not 
assert that there was no dispute concerning Mr. Wagner's 
reasonable expectations and did not purport to even base its 
motion on the deposition testimony of Mr. Coleman. See 
Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment at p* 2. This 
testimony was presented to the lower court in support of 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. While this Court is 
clearly of the opinion that plaintiff's motion was properly 
denied, that should not equate to a holding that defendant's 
motion was properly granted. The unresolved issue of fact, 
which had not been developed or ruled upon in the court below, 
was whether Mr. Wagner had a reasonable expectation of coverage 
under the circumstances of the case. 
The Court's error in reviewing this matter was its 
examination of the record to determine if plaintiff had proven 
her case as of the date of the defendant's motion was heard. 
The plaintiff has no such burden in opposing a motion for 
summary judgment, and certainly not when the motion was 
predicated on an issue of law. 
While the Court indicated that it has made a "thorough 
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review of the record" and found the plaintiff's evidence 
wanting in establishing her case, it must be remembered that 
this is not the Court's function in reviewing the grant of a 
motion for summary judgment. It is axiomatic that in reviewing 
the grant of a motion for summary judgment all doubts, 
uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact must be 
construed in the light most favorable to the party resisting 
the motion. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & 
Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). It is the moving 
party's burden to marshal all the evidence and he is only 
entitled to judgment "where [he] makes a showing which 
precludes, as a matter of law, the awarding of any relief to 
the losing party." FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 
594 P.2d 1332, 1334 (1979). Here, the moving party offered no 
evidence of Mr. Wagner's expectation or its reasonableness, nor 
did the court below make any factual finding on the question. 
The court below ruled that the doctrine of reasonable 
expectation was not the law in Utah. This Court disagreed, but 
failed to recognize that the trial court had not addressed the 
fact issue, which it deemed to be immaterial. The effect of 
this Court's ruling, upon grounds differing from those advanced 
in the trial court, is to preclude plaintiff from the 
opportunity of developing or presenting her evidence to the 
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factfinder for determination. As our Supreme Court stated in 
Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters/ 
Inc., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 (1965), 
It is . . . to safeguard the right of access 
to the courts for the enforcement of rights 
and the remedy of wrongs by a trial, and by 
a jury if desired, that it is of such 
importance that the court should take care 
to see that the party adversely affected has 
a fair opportunity to present his 
contentions against precipitate action which 
will deprive him of that privilege* His 
contentions as to facts should be considered 
in the light most favorable to him, and only 
if it clearly appears that he could not 
establish a right to recovery under the law 
should such action [entry of summary 
judgment] be taken; and any doubts which 
exist should be resolved in favor of 
affording him the privilege of a trial. 
398 Utah 2d 685. 
As noted by Justice Durham in State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042, 1048-49 (Utah 1987) 
(Durham, J., dissenting), if the issue of an insured's 
reasonable expectations is squarely put before the trial court, 
judgment for the insurer cannot be sustained unless that issue 
has been the subject of factual findings by the court. 
Such findings have not been made in this case. This 
Court incorrectly treated this action as though the plaintiff 
was appealing from an adverse ruling on the basis of stipulated 
facts. This is incorrect. The basic fact about which the 
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parties have not agree'd, and upon which plaintiff has not 
received a determination by the trier of fact, is Mr, Wagner's 
reasonable expectation of coverage. This Court should not 
substitute its judgment on this question for that of the 
factfinder on the basis of evidence contained in a truncated 
record. 
CONCLUSION 
The reasonable expectations of an insured presents a 
factual issue which must be presented to the factfinder for 
resolution on the basis of extrinsic evidence and reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom. This has never occurred in 
this action. Plaintiff is entitled to develop her evidence and 
present it to the trial court even if this Court is of the 
opinion that it would resolve that question against her on the 
basis of what it presently knows of the evidence. Weighing the 
evidence and inferences to be drawn from the evidence is not a 
function of an appellate court. This is the province of the 
trial court and it has yet to occur in this case. Accordingly, 
the matter should be remanded for resolution of the factual 
issue presented on the basis of the standards outlined in the 
Court's prior opinion. 
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DATED this 1$™ day of January, 1990. 
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Judgment and sentence was entered on September 12, 1988. 
Defendant was placed on probation at that time and a term and 
condition of the probation was that he serve thirty days in the 
Salt Lake County Jail. 
A Certificate of Probable Cause was sought and granted on 
September 16, 1988, and an appeal bond was filed on that same day. 
A Notice of Appeal was filed on September 16, 1988, and the 
case was docketed in the Utah Supreme Court. 
On May 16, 1989, pursuant to the authority vested in the 
Utah Supreme Court, this case was poured-over to the Court of 
Appeals for disposition. 
Various extensions have been sought and obtained for the 
filing of Appellant's Brief, both in the Utah Supreme Court and in 
the Utah Court of Appeals, resulting in the filing of the Brief of 
Appellant herein. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
POINT 1: WAS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUSTAIN THE CONVICTIONS OF AGGRAVATED 
ARSON AND INSURANCE FRAUD? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the case. Appellant was convicted of 
aggravated arson, a first degree felony and insurance fraud, a 
second degree felony. From those convictions he appeals. 
2. Course of proceedings. Appellant was convicted of 
aggravated arson, a first degree felony and insurance fraud, a 
second degree felony. From those convictions he appeals. 
3. Disposition of trial court. Appellant was convicted 
of a first degree felony, aggravated arson and a second felony 
insurance fraud. He was sentenced to the Utah State Prison and 
the District Court stayed the imposition of sentence, placing 
Defendant on probation, with the term and condition of that 
probation that he serve thirty (30) days in the Salt Lake County 
Jail. A Certificate of Probable Cause was sought and obtained 
from the Trial Court, and an Appeal Bond was filed in that Court, 
pending conclusion of the Appeal. 
4. Relevant facts. In September of 1986, the Appellant 
and his wife selected from approximately 18 homes that they were 
shown by a real estate agent, the home situated in Sandy, Utah, at 
802 Johnson Way. (Tr. of Trial, p. 428) 
From the date of purchase until the time of the fire, the 
Appellant and his wife made various repairs to the home, including 
finishing a room downstairs and the preparation for a new child by 
way of preparing a room to be a nursery in the home. (Tr. of 
Trial, pp. 509-514) 
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On November 1, 1987, a fire occurred in the basement of 
Appellant's home, causing approximately $25,000.00 in damage. 
This fire occurred between 10:20 p.m. and 10:31 p.m., with the 
first call to dispatch being placed at 10:33 p.m., and the fire 
being declared under control at 10:44 p.m. (Tr. of Trial, pp. 
269-271) 
At the time of the fire, Appellant's wife was in Arizona 
on business. (Tr. of Trial, p. 300) 
At 10:12 p.m. on that same evening, Appellant's wife 
called him from Arizona and the call lasted 12 minutes and 
concluded at 10:20 p.m. (Tr. of Trial, p. 300) 
A witness who was in the room with Appellant's wife in 
Arizona testified that nothing unusual occurred during the 
conversation and that Appellant's wife did not indicate that 
Appellant was upset about anything as a result of the telephone 
call. (Tr. of Trial, p. 546) 
The fire occurred in the laundry room of Appellant's home 
at or around the base of an ironing board stored in that room 
where there were torn up bed sheets or the remains of a halloween 
costume worn by Appellant on October 30, 1987, at a halloween 
party. After the halloween party, he had cut the bed sheets from 
his body and simply dropped them at the base of the ironing board. 
(Tr. of Trial, p. 363) 
At the time the Sandy City Fire Department responded to 
the fire, assistant Chief Andrew Glad supervised the fire and 
assisted in the investigation at the scene of the fire. (Tr. of 
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Trial , [., 1>">4) 
Chief Glad testified that he recovered an iron : ton the 
material at the foot of the i roning board and gave the iror to 
Captain Mildrum. the i lext clay. • <=?;. J .tr -i "/.^  s -r.e 
bedding on. the floor at or around the base . - "he .roning board • 
(Tr < i> f T r i a 1 , pp. 156-159) 
Although the State of Utah, through J;.-. -i a. *.. . .JI, 
did not subject the iron to any kind of scientific analysis or 
submi f i t t : s ::r i me li at for ana.] ysi sJP h • i : ac|ed that the iron 
was not the cause of the f,i re. (Tr. i Trial ^ ino\ 
Because the Appellant was the sole occupant of *:ne house 
and Captain
 : u .<• - • 
fire, Appellant was charged with aggravated arsor r t r ~-. , 
pp 3 06 • 3] 0) 
Located on the toe of the i •- • ^ • •>* 
substance which Captain Mildrum attached no significance t-; ir 
tormina hii ufHttiu'h t In it- I hi- f i TR IAMS not accidentally started. 
(Tr, of Trial, p. J1I» He tformed his opinion, wi :..;:cut. examining 
the bed sheets which were in and around the place of ori^:r. T'r. 
of I i: I a] j: 31 9) 
Captain Mildrum also discounted the possibility ^hat ieat 
had been encapsulated, based upon his opinion that ther<j w: •- : :.,e 
a build up nf smoke prjoi In \ \w t i i H .L.iirt. 
notified persons in the house of the existence ->t i t , r* 
Trial JS) 
Captain Mildrum a] so attached no s igni f icance to the 
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configuration of the iron and the melted plastic in and around the 
iron in forming his opinion. (Tr. of Trial, p. 343) 
He did testify that during the time of the trial he had 
contacted the National Fire Academy who informed him that bed 
sheets burn and may ignite at a temperature of between 525-560 
degrees fahrenheit. (Tr. of Trial, p. 280) 
After Appellant was charged with this crime and prior to 
trial, he submitted the iron and the bed sheets, along with carpet 
material found in the room in and around the source of the fire to 
the Weber State Crime Lab to perform various scientific analysis 
of those items. (Tr. of Trial, pp. 434-438) 
Art Turkelson of the Weber State Crime Lab testified that 
the burned on material on the toe to the iron was burned on carpet 
material. (Tr. of Trial, p. 445) He also determined, based upon 
an analysis and examination of the iron that the bedding material 
or the torn up bed sheets were melted into the side of the iron 
and was melted or burned into the top of the iron. (Tr. of Trial, 
p. 445) 
Mr. Turkelson also determined that the iron had been on 
during the fire and had shorted out, causing arcing from an 
external source. (Tr. of Trial, p. 446) 
Mr. Turkelson also examined the configuration of the 
melted plastic on the iron and determined that at the time of the 
fire, the iron was at a 45 degree to 25 degree angle when the 
plastic melted, with the nose sticking up. (Tr. of Trial, p. 447) 
The melting was inconsistent with the iron being in an upright 
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position or a flat position at the time of the fire. (Tr. of 
Trial, p. 447) 
The washer and the dryer in the laundry room were elevated 
by the method of being placed on a wooden pallet and carpeting 
being laid over that wooden pallet so as to prevent flooding in 
the event of malfunction of the washer, (Tr. of Trial, pp. 153-
169) Two large rambunctious dogs had access to the room where 
the fire occurred from 6:00 to 9:00 p.m. on the day of the fire. 
(Tr. of Trial, pp. 521-525) 
A person by the name of Duane Moyes from the Weber State 
Crime Lab, who, in addition to working at the Weber State Crime 
Lab, teaches arson classes at Weber State and has been involved in 
arson investigations for some time, also testified for the 
Defendant. He testified that after performing various scientific 
tests regarding heat and encapsulation of heat, concluded that a 
constant source of heat at 3 75 degrees with some encapsulation 
could produce heat in excess of 525 degrees. (Tr. of Trial, pp. 
471-472) 
He further concluded as a result of actually performing a 
test in the lab, that during this process of heating material to 
the point of ignition that the emanation of smoke only occurs from 
three to five minutes prior to ignition. (Tr. of Trial, p. 474) 
The sole expert witness to testify for the State was 
Captain Dave Mildrum who concluded that there would be an 
emanation of smoke and smoldering effect for some hours prior to 
the actual ignition, which would make Appellant's explanation 
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implausible. However, he performed no scientific test to arrive 
at that conclusion. (Tr. of Trial, p. 282) He also concluded 
that the iron was not involved in the fire because he erroneously 
assumed that the iron was upright on the board at the time of the 
fire. (Tr. of Trial, pp. 282 and 309) He formed his opinion that 
the fire was started by Appellant without examining the bed sheets 
or subjecting the iron to a crime lab for analysis. 
At the time of the trial, Appellant recreated for the jury 
the exact room with the elevated platform which the washer and 
dryer was located on and the dimensions of the room exactly as 
they appeared. (Tr. of Trial, pp. 507-508) 
Notwithstanding the jury convicted Appellant of aggravated 
arson and insurance fraud based upon the arson charge. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There was insufficient evidence upon which to sustain the 
guilty verdicts rendered by the jury because the physical evidence 
was inconsistent with the opinion evidence of the only State 
witness and reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt regarding the Appellant's guilt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE 
WAS SUFFICIENTLY INCONCLUSIVE OR 
INHERENTLY IMPROBABLE, BASED UPON THE 
OBJECTIVE FACTS PRESENTED THAT A 
REASONABLE PERSON MUST HAVE 
ENTERTAINED A REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO 
THE APPELLANT'S GUILT. 
The test for reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim 
is well settled. In State v. Lariby. 699 P. 2d 1187, 1207 (Utah 
8 
1984), set forth the standard as follows: 
We review the evidence of all inferences which 
may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. We reverse 
a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only 
when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted. 
See also State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (1980); 
State v, Lammr 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); State v. Gorlick, 605 P.2d 
761, 762 (1979); State v. Romero. 554 P.2d 216, 219 (1976); State 
v. Petreer 659 P. 2d 443, 444 (Utah, 1983); and most recently, State 
v. Cobb, P.2d , 107 Ut.Adv.Rptr., 43 (Utah 1989). 
In the case at bar, the following facts were established 
beyond any reasonable doubt. 
The fire which damaged the Appellant's home occurred 
between 10:20 and 10:30 p.m. on November 1, 1987. At the time of 
the fire, the Appellant was the only occupant of the house. 
At or around the base of the ironing board, there were torn 
up bed sheets or the remains of a "mummy costume" worn by the 
Appellant on October 30, 1987, and placed there after he arrived 
home from that halloween party on that date. 
There was an iron discovered and removed from those bed 
sheets which had carpet burned or baked onto the toe of the iron. 
The iron was on prior to the fire and shorted out during the fire 
as a result of the fire burning through the cord of the iron and 
causing an arcing in the cord of the iron. This arcing cut off 
the power supply to the iron, thus cooling it off. 
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The iron heats to a temperature under normal conditions of 
375 degrees fahrenheit, plus or minus 20 degrees. This 
temperature, over a period of time, would heat to a point of 
ignition of 525 degrees fahrenheit which is the temperature 
required to cause the bed sheets to ignite. 
Smoke only occurs 3-5 minutes prior to the ignition of the 
bed sheets. 
Bed sheets were burned into the side and top of the iron 
and the melting of the plastic on the top of the iron or the handle 
and control of the iron proved that at the time it was exposed to 
heat, it was neither lying flat, nor tilted in a complete upright 
position, but lying in a position consistent with its exposure to 
the carpet material, in and around the area of the bed sheets. The 
bed sheeting material burned onto the side and top of the iron 
would only be consistent with the encapsulation of the iron inside 
of the bed sheets. 
It was undisputed that two large dogs had access to the 
house on the day of November 1, 1987, from approximately 6:00 p.m. 
until 9:00 p.m., and specifically had access to the area where the 
fire started. 
It is respectfully submitted that the only expert witness 
produced by the State formulated his opinions regarding the cause 
and source of the fire prior to taking into account the physical 
evidence as produced at the time of the trial. For example, he did 
not take into account the position of the iron as depicted by the 
melted material around the iron in formulating his opinion, but 
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relied specifically on erroneous information, that is, that the 
iron was located from the ironing board in an upright position• 
That conclusion is completely inconsistent with the physical 
evidence and the testing performed by the Weber State Crime Lab. 
Captain Mildrum also assumed erroneously that an iron, if embedded 
within bed sheets would smoke for hours and hours and hours prior 
to the ignition point of those bed sheets. Specific tests were 
performed by scientists in a crime lab which proved beyond 
peradventure that smoking only occurs approximately 3-5 minutes 
prior to the ignition point. 
The verdicts in this case cannot be squared with the 
physical evidence produced at trial. This is not a case where 
there were inconsistent eye-witness accounts or inconsistent 
accounts as to how the fire occurred. There was specific physical 
evidence, and as has been noted by legal scholars, physical 
evidence does not lie. That physical evidence is wholly consistent 
with the Appellant being not guilty and totally inconsistent with 
the verdict in this case. 
At times in the criminal justice system, the system, for 
whatever reason, breaks down and does not work properly. These 
instances are few and far between in counsel's estimation. 
However, in this case, the system did, in fact, break down and 
injustice occurred. The injustice was the verdict of guilt 
rendered, based upon the evidence that was presented to this jury. 
This court has an opportunity to correct that injustice, and the 
standard as articulated is met when the evidence is so inconclusive 
11 
or improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a doubt 
which was reasonable as to the Appellant's guilt. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse Appellant's convictions based upon 
insufficiency of the evidence and discharge this Appellant. 
DATED this day of ., 1989. 
BROWN & COX 
KENNETH R. BROWN 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of , 1989, 
a true and correct copy of Appellant's Brief was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
236 South State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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TITLE 76, CHAPTER 6, SEC. 103, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, as amended 1 
TITLE 76, CHAPTER 6, SEC. 521, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, as amended 2 
CROSS EXAMINATION OF DAVE MILDRUM, CONSISTING OF 
VARIOUS PAGES STARTING AT PAGE 303 THROUGH 363, OF THE 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT . 3 
OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 76-6-106 
Elements of offense. 
This section requires as an element of arson 
that a person intentionally damage property. 
State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 
1984). 
Evidence. 
—Sufficient. 
Evidence regarding how and when a fire was 
started, evidence that a fire was set in exactly 
the manner that the defendant had threatened 
in the event that he was fired, and the finding 
of the defendant's handprint on an overturned 
76-6-103. Aggravated arson. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-103, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-103; 1986, ch. 59, § 2. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1986 amendment 
added the Subsection (1) designation and sub-
stituted "first degree" for "second degree" in 
Subsection (2). 
ANALYSIS 
Evidence. 
—Sufficient. 
Liability of property owner or his agent. 
76-6-104. Reckless burning. 
Cross-References. — Fires set during 
closed fire season without securing permit as 
misdemeanors, § 65A-8-11. 
76-6-106. Criminal mischief. 
ANALYSIS 
Felony charge. 
Cited. 
Felony charge. 
Defendant's smashing of windshields, in 
rapid succession, of sixteen separately owned 
automobiles that were parked at the same 
parking lot was not a single act, but consti-
tuted separate acts with each being a violation 
drum of a flammable chemical was sufficient to 
convict the defendant of burglary and arson. 
State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892 (Utah 1986). 
Restitution to insurance company. 
The court did not exceed its authority in or-
dering the defendant, convicted of intention-
ally, willfully, and maliciously committing 
arson upon his house, to reimburse insurance 
companies for their loss in compensating the 
bank which acquired the house through fore-
closure. State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611 (Utah 
1985). 
Evidence. 
—Sufficient. 
Circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain 
conviction. See State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123 
(Utah 1986). 
Liability of property owner or his agent. 
Where owner of house hired defendant to 
burn it, owner could be convicted of aggravated 
arson for burning his own house in absence of 
evidence of accident or lawful purpose, and 
therefore it was no defense for defendant that 
he was acting under the direction of the owner. 
State v. Durant, 674 P.2d 638 (Utah 1983). 
of this section, and state could not, for purpose 
of charging defendant with a felony under this 
section, aggregate the damages suffered by the 
individual property owners from the separate 
acts of vandalism to satisfy the minimum valu-
ation required to constitute a felony. State v. 
Barker, 624 P.2d 694 (Utah 1981). 
Cited in State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 
1986). 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or explosives 
he intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure; or 
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a participant in the 
offense is in the structure or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree. 
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76-6-519 CRIMINAL CODE 
(c) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded exceeds $1,000 
but is less than $2,500, the offense is a felony of the third degree. 
(d) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded exceeds $2,500, 
the offense is a felony of the second degree. 
History: Oe 1953, 76-6-518, enacted by CoUateral References. 
L. 197S, ch. 196, §76-6-518. Fraud<S=>68. 
37 C.J.S. Fraud § 154. 
37 Am. Jur. 2d 32, Fraud and Deceit 
§ 11. 
76-6-519. Setting up or operating pyramid scheme.—(1) A person is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor if he sets up or operates a pyramid scheme. 
(2) As used in this section: 
(a) "Pyramid scheme" means a scheme whereby anything of monetary 
value is distributed among persons who have paid compensation for the 
chance to receive compensation : 
(i) For introducing another person into participation in the scheme; 
or 
(ii) When any person introduced into participation in the scheme 
introduces another person into participation. 
(b) "Compensation" does not include payment based upon sales made 
to persons who are not participants in the scheme and who are not purchas-
ing in order to participate in the scheme. 
History: O. 1953, 76-6-519, enacted by CoUateral References. 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-519. Validity of pyramid distribution plan, 
54 A. L. R. 3d 217. 
76-6-520c Criminal usury*—(1) A person is guilty of criminal usury 
when he knowingly engages in or directly or indirectly provides 'financing 
for the business of making loans at a higher rate of interest or considera-
tion therefor than is authorized by law. 
(2) Criminal usury is a felony of the third degree. 
History: O. 1953, 76-6-520, enacted by Collateral References. 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-520. Usury<S=*149. 
91 C.J.S. Usury § 160. 
45 Am. Jur. 2d 272, Interest and Usury 
§357. 
76-6-521. False or fraudulent insurance claim—Punishment as for theft. 
—Every person who presents, or causes to be presented, any false or fraudu-
lent claim, or any proof in support of any such claim, upon any contract of 
insurance for the payment of any loss, or who prepares, makes or sub-
scribes any account, certificate of survey, afBdavit or proof of loss, or other 
book, paper or writing, with intent to present or use the same, or to allow 
it to be presented or used, in support of any such claim is punishable as in 
the manner prescribed for theft of property of like value. 
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A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q NOW, IN TERMS OF THE KIND OF THINGS THAT YOU DO, 
WOULD YOU EXPLAIN TO THE JURY IF THERE IS ANY SIGNIFICANCE 
TO THE FILING OF YOUR REPORT? j 
i 
A ANY SIGNIFICANCE — I'M SORRY. I DON'T 
UNDERSTAND THE QUESTION. 
Q YES. DO YOU FILE A REPORT IN CONNECTION WITH 
YOUR INVESTIGATIONS? 
A YES, I DO. 
Q AND YOU SELECT WHAT GOES INTO THIS REPORT? 
A YES, I DO. 
Q OKAY. AND WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THAT REPORT? 
A TO BUILD A CASE SO AT SOME POINT IN TIME IF 
PROSECUTION BECOMES NECESSARY, THAT CASE CAN BE PULLED BACK 
OUT. 
0 AND IN CONNECTION WITH THAT, YOU SELECT, I ASSUME, 
WHAT IS SIGNIFICANT TO PUT IN THAT REPORT? 
A I DO. 
Q AND THEN YOU PUT THAT REPORT TOGETHER AND THEN 
YOU RELY UPON THE INFORMATION IN THAT REPORT; WOULD THAT 
BE A FAIR STATEMENT? 
A THAT REPORT AND OTHER THINGS, YES. 
Q NOW, I BELIEVE YOU TESTIFIED ON DIRECT 
EXAMINATION THAT YOU FORMULATED AN OPINION AS EARLY AS 
NOVEMBER 3RD OR i+TH --
- 3 -
A THAT IS CORRECT. 
Q -- THAT THIS WAS AN ARSON FIRE? 
A THAT IS CORRECT. 
Q OKAY. NOW, AT THAT POINT IN TIME YOU HAD SIMPLY 
SEEN THE HOUSE ONCE? 
A THAT IS CORRECT. 
Q OKAY. AND AT THAT POINT IN TIME THE ONLY THING 
YOU HAD WAS AN IRON? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q IN EVIDENCE? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND THE IRON WAS GIVEN TO YOU BY CHIEF GLAD, I 
TAKE IT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q OKAY. DO YOU RECALL WHEN HE GAVE YOU THAT IRON? 
A IT WOULD BE ON THE SECOND. 
Q THE 2ND OF NOVEMBER? 
A MORNING OF THE SECOND. 
Q THEN YOU TOOK CONTROL AND CUSTODY OF THAT IRON 
AT THAT POINT IN TIME? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND ALSO YOU MENTIONED IN YOUR DIRECT EXAMINATION 
THE IMPORTANCE OF SECURING THE SCENE OR PRESERVING IT, AS 
I THINK YOU PHRASE IT, PRESERVING THE SCENE. 
A I DON'T THINK WE TALKED ABOUT PRESERVING THE 
//_ 
A THAT IS CORRECT. 
Q CUSTODY AND CONTROL? 
A THAT IS CORRECT. 
Q IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR INVESTIGATION, OFFICER, 
AND IN CONNECTION WITH THE PREPARATION OF YOUR REPORT, 
DID YOU NOTE THE POSITION OF THE IRON? 
A POSITION IN THE HOME? 
Q YES. 
A NO, I DID NOT. 
Q OKAY. WERE YOU PROVIDED INFORMATION THAT YOU 
RELIED UPON AS TO THE POSITION OF THE IRON DURING THE FIRE? 
A I WAS. 
Q AND WHAT WAS THAT INFORMATION? 
A THE INFORMATION WAS THAT THE IRON WAS ON THE 
IRONING BOARD. 
Q AND NOT JUST SIMPLY ON THE IRONING BOARD, IT WAS 
IN AN UPRIGHT POSITION? 
A UPRIGHT POSITION ON THE IRONING BOARD; THAT IS 
CORRECT. 
Q AND YOU MENTION THAT IN YOUR REPORT NOT ONCE, 
NOT TWICE, BUT THREE TIMES; DO YOU NOT? 
A I HAVE TO LOOK. 
Q OKAY. TAKE A LOOK. 
A THAT'S A POSSIBILITY. 
Q PAGES 3 AND 4. 
<~ 
A PAGES OF MY REPORT AREN'T NUMBERED. THREE AND 
2 I FOUR? 
3 Q YES. 
4
 A I SEE TWO. 
5 Q OKAY. TWO REFERENCES TO THE FACT THAT TADD 
6
 I NORRIS TOLD YOU THAT THE IRON WAS IN AN UPRIGHT POSITION 
7 ON THE IRONING BOARD AT THE TIME OF THE FIRE. 
8 A THAT IS CORRECT. 
9 Q AND YOU RELIED UPON THAT INFORMATION, I ASSUME, 
10 | IN FORMULATING YOUR OPINION? 
1' A THE OPINION AS TO THE CAUSE OF THE FIRE? 
12 Q YES. 
13 A THAT AND OTHER THINGS, YES. 
14
 I Q THAT AND OTHER THINGS. BUT YOU DID RELY UPON 
THAT. 
A YES, THAT AND OTHER THINGS, I DID. 
Q NOW, THIS IRON IS AN INTERESTING APPARATUS. HAVE 
YOU TAKEN A LOOK AT THAT LATELY? 
A THIS ONE? 
Q YES, THIS ONE RIGHT HERE. DID YOU -- THIS AREA 
RIGHT HERE WAS ON THE IRON AT THE TIME THAT YOU TOOK IT 
INTO POSSESSION? 
A YES. 
Q WAS IT NOT? 
A YES, I T WAS. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
IJO 
1 Q DID YOU EVER, DURING THE COURSE OF YOUR 
2 INVESTIGATION, SUBMIT THAT IRON TO ANY KIND OF A CRIME 
3 LAB FOR THEM TO DETERMINE WHAT, IF ANYTHING, THAT IS ON 
4
 THE IRON? 
5 A NO. 
6 j Q THEN I ASSUME THAT YOU ATTACHED NO SIGNIFICANCE 
7 I TO WHATEVER IS ON THAT IRON? 
i 
8 I A THAT'S CORRECT. 
9 Q AND SO IN FORMULATING YOUR OPINION AS TO THE 
10 CAUSE AND ORIGIN AND AS TO THE FACT THAT THIS IS AN ARSON 
11 FIRE, YOU ATTACHED NO SIGNIFICANCE TO THIS CONFIGURATION 
12 ON THE FACE OF THE IRON? 
13 A I ATTACH NO SIGNIFICANCE TO THE IRON IN ANY WAY. 
14
 MR. BROWN: I WONDER IF I COULD HAVE HIM STEP 
15j DOWN HERE FOR JUST A MOMENT, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: YES, YOU MAY DO SO. 
0 (BY MR. BROWN) OFFICER, DOES THIS APPEAR TO BE 
A RE-CREATION OF THAT ROOM? 
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 i A YES. IT APPEARS TO BE REASONABLY CORRECT. 
Q OKAY. NOW, I BELIEVE YOU TESTIFIED ON DIRECT 
EXAMINATION THAT THE FIRE STARTED HERE; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A IN THIS AREA RIGHT HERE? YES. 
Q YES. 
A THAT IS CORRECT. 
Q AND 1 WILL LIFT THIS UP. DO YOU SEE THAT CHARRING 
16 
17 
18 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q OKAY. AND WHY WAS THAT? YOU ATTACHED NO 
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE IRONING BOARD? 
A NO. 
0 NONE AT ALL? 
A NONE AT ALL. 
Q YOU THINK BY LOOKING AT THE IRONING BOARD YOU 
MAY BE ABLE TO DETERMINE THE POSITION OF THE IRONING BOARD 
AT THE TIME OF THE FIRE? 
A WELL, CERTAINLY. 
Q CERTAINLY. I WONDER IF YOU WOULD COME DOWN HERE 
AND TAKE A LOOK AT THIS IRONING BOARD. TAKE A LOOK RIGHT 
HERE AT THE TOP, OFFICER, RIGHT HERE. 
A OKAY. 
Q THIS IS AT A POINT AT OR NEAR THE FLOOR; IS IT 
NOT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q OKAY. WOULD THIS MATERIAL HERE BE CONSISTENT 
WITH THE IRON PROTRUDING OFF THIS LEDGE AT THE TIME OF 
THE FIRE? 
A NOT NECESSARILY, NO. 
Q ALL RIGHT. 
A THIS MATERIAL INDICATES CARPET. THAT'S ALL IT 
INDICATES. 
Q THAT'S RIGHT. IT INDICATES CARPETING. WHAT 
DOES CARPETING INDICATE TO THE IRON IF IT'S BURNED OFF? 
z i c 
1 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
2 Q AND WHAT DOES AN IRON DO WHEN IT'S KICKED OFF? 
3 J A COOLS DOWN. 
4 Q COOLS DOWN — 
5 I A TURNS OFF. 
6 Q DOES IT NOT? 
7 A YES. 
8 I Q IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR INVESTIGATION YOU BEGAN 
9 IT NOVEMBER 2ND. WHEN EXACTLY DID YOU TAKE POSSESSION OF 
10 I THE BED SHEETS? 
n A BED SHEETS WERE TAKEN INTO POSSESSION ON 
12 | DECEMBER 10TH. 
13| Q AND THAT WAS AFTER YOU FORMED YOUR OPINION? 
14 A YES. 
15 I Q ALL RIGHT. AND YOU HAVE DETERMINED THAT THE 
16| BED SHEETS, THAT THE IRON LOCATED ON THE BED SHEETS WAS j 
i 
17 I NOT THE SOURCE OF THE FIRE? 
i 
I 
13j A I DETERMINED THAT THE IRON IS NOT THE SOURCE 
19 OF THE FIRE NO MATTER WHERE IT WAS. 
20 Q RIGHT. 
21 I A THAT'S CORRECT. 
22 Q YOU INDICATED IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR INVESTI-
23 I GATION THAT YOU MADE SOME DETERMINATION REGARDING THE 
24 | WINDOW, AND THE WINDOW WOULD BE LOCATED HERE? 
25I A THAT'S CORRECT. 
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MR. BROWN: NO. THAT WASN'T THE QUESTION. 
Q (BY MR. BROWN) DID YOU NOT TELL MR. ASHBY THAT? 
A 1 TOLD MR. ASHBY I WASN'T SURE, BUT THAT'S WHAT 
I ASSUMED. 
Q THAT'S WHAT YOU ASSUMED? 
A WHEN MR. ASHBY CALLED ME HE WAS INQUIRING ABOUT 
THE TIME OF THE CALL. WE HADN'T RECEIVED INFORMATION BACK 
FROM THE DISPATCH CENTER YET TO TELL US WHO THE FIRST CALL 
'CAME FROM, LET ALONE WHEN IT WAS, OR ANYTHING ELSE. WE 
WERE VERY PREMATURE IN THE INVESTIGATION AT THIS POINT AND 
I TOLD HIM I WASN'T SURE BUT I ASSUMED SOMEBODY HAD SEEN 
THE FIRE AND REPORTED IT. 
Q LET ME FIND THAT PARTICULAR REPORT. 
DID YOU NOT TELL JIM ASHBY, THE INVESTIGATOR FOR 
FARMERS, THAT THERE WERE MULTI CALLS PLACED IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE REPORT OF THIS FIRE? 
A I MAY HAVE. 
Q DID YOU NOT TELL HIM THAT THE FIRE CALL WAS 
RECEIVED BY THE NEIGHBOR IMMEDIATELY BEHIND THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY? 
A I MAY HAVE. I DON'T KNOW WHAT I TOLD JIM ASHBY. 
IT WAS A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION AND I MADE NO NOTES. 
Q DID YOU TELL MR. ASHBY, YOU INDICATED HE HAD 
GONE TO THE HOME OF THE NEIGHBOR IN QUESTION AND WAS 
ADVISED THEY, IN FACT, SAW THE FIRE AND CALLED IT IN PRIOR 
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1 TO THE INSURED COMING TO THEIR HOUSE TO ADVISE THEM OF THE 
2 FIRE? 
3 I A I MAY HAVE. 
4 Q AND WHAT YOU ARE TELLING US IS THAT YOU ASSUME 
5 THAT? 
6 | A THAT'S WHAT I'M TELLING YOU, YES. 
7 Q WE DO KNOW ONE THING, WE KNOW -- YOU'RE SAYING 
8 THAT THIS CONVERSATION WITH THE KELLEYS NEVER OCCURRED? 
9! A WHICH CONVERSATION? 
10 I Q THE CONVERSATION WHERE THEY MAY HAVE TOLD YOU 
11 THEY CALLED THE FIRE IN PRIOR TO THE TIME TOM SHOWED UP --
12 A I CAN'T TELL YOU I SAID THAT AT ALL. 
13 I Q ARE YOU SAYING -- DID YOU EVER HAVE A CONVERSATION 
14 WITH MR. AND MRS. KELLEY WHERE THEY INDICATED THAT THEY 
15 I CALLED THE FIRE IN, EITHER ONE OF THEM, PRIOR TO THE TIME 
16 | MR. BECKSTEAD-PORTER REPORTED THE FIRE TO THEM? 
17 I A NO. 
Q SO, YOU SPECULATED, YOU ASSUMED WITH MR. ASHBY? 
19 I A CORRECT. 
20 I Q WITH REGARDS TO THAT? 
21 | A THAT IS CORRECT. 
Q ALL RIGHT. NOW, IN CONNECTION WITH THIS CASE 
23 | YOU SAY THAT THE INTERVIEWS ARE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT? 
24
 I A THAT'S TRUE. 
Q WITNESS STATEMENTS, INTERVIEWS, THOSE ARE ONE 
18 
22 
25 
1 WAS SAID AND WE KNOW WHEN IT WAS SAID 
2 A THAT'S RIGHT 
3 Q AND YOU MADE THIS REPORT OUT WELL AFTER YOU HAD 
4
 TAKEN THIS STATEMENT; DID YOU NOT? 
5 j A YES, I DID 
6 Q SO, YOU CONSIDERED IT, I ASS U M E , AS SIGNIFICANT 
7
 I AS TO WHETHER OR NOT M R S . BECKSTEAD-PORTER WAS POSITIVE 
8 THAT SHE MAY HAVE TURNED THE IRON OFF? 
9 A I ASSUMED NOTHING. THE WAY I READ THE REPORT, 
10 I MRS. PORTER -- MRS. BECKSTEAD-PORTER WAS PRETTY SURE SHE 
TURNED THE IRON OFF. YOU AND I, WHEN WE TALKED ABOUT IT, 
12 1 BEFORE YOU BROUGHT THAT TO MY ATTENTION -- AND THAT'S THE 
13 FIRST TIME 1 NOTICED IT, 
14
 Q AND THAT HAS NO EFFECT ON YOUR OPINION? 
15
 I A AS TO THE CAUSE OF THE FIRE? 
Q YES. 
17
 j A NONE 
18 
11 
16 
19 
20 
Q AND AS TO THE FACT — WE KNOW THE CAUSE, WE KNOW 
THE ORIGIN, BUT AS TO THE FACT THAT THIS FIRE IS INTENTION-
ALLY SET? 
21
 | A NONE WHATSOEVER. 
22 , 
Q IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR INVESTIGATION, OFFICER, 
23
 | DID YOU TAKE UP ANY CARPET? 
24
 I A YES. 
25 
Q DO YOU HAVE THE CARPET? 
Q BUT YOU TOOK THESE INTO YOUR POSSESSION, DID YOU 
NOT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q DID MY INVESTIGATOR GET THESE FROM YOU? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q YOU HAD ADEQUATE TIME TO ANALYZE THESE BED SHEETS? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q YOU ALSO HAD ACCESS TO THE CARPET? 
A YES, WE DID. 
Q AND YOU DIDN'T EVER SUBMIT THAT TO A LABORATORY 
FOR ANALYSIS? 
A NO, WE DIDN'T. THERE WAS NO REASON TO. 
Q IN YOUR OPINION, I MIGHT SAY. 
A IN OUR OPINION, THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q SO, THE PLAIN-AND-SIMPLE FACT IS THAT YOU DIDN'T 
DO IT. 
A PLAIN-AND-SIMPLE FACT IS WE DIDN'T NEED TO DO IT. 
Q YOUR OPINION. 
A IN MY OPINION. 
Q AND SO YOU PLACED THIS TELEPHONE CALL A COUPLE 
DAYS AGO EVEN THOUGH YOU FORMULATED YOUR OPINION IN NOVEMBER 
AND YOU DETERMINED THE IGNITION POINT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND YOU DETERMINED IT TO BE AROUND 525 DEGREES? 
A 525 TO 565. 
T.X 1 
I 
18 
THE ROOM OR INTO THE REST OF THE ATMOSPHERE. 
Q GOING BACK TO MY BONFIRE EXAMPLE, IF THE THING 
DIGS A HOLE FOR ITSELF IT STARTS TO ENCAPSULATE? 
A YES. 
Q DOES IT NOT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND WHAT THAT IS REALLY TALKING ABOUT, IT'S 
TALKING ABOUT HEAT GENERATING HEAT FROM NOT ONLY THE SOURCE, 
BUT FROM ITSELF; DOES IT NOT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q SO, IT'S MULTIPLYING ITSELF; IS IT NOT? 
A THAT'S RIGHT. 
Q AND THIS HEAT SOURCE MAY BE AT 375 DEGREES PLUS 
OR MINUS 20 DEGREES; IT MAY GENERATE MORE HEAT THAN THAT; 
IS THAT RIGHT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND YOUR OPINION IS BASED UPON YOUR OPINION THAT 
IT WAS INTENTIONALLY SET AS OPPOSED TO PERHAPS ACCIDENTALLY 
19 j AS A RESULT OF THE I R O N — IS THAT IF THAT ENCAPSULATION 
20 J OCURRED THERE WOULD BE THIS GIANT BUILD-UP OF SMOKE; IS 
21 | THAT RIGHT? 
22
 A THE BUILD-UP OF SMOKE AND THE TIME LAPSE, THAT IS 
23 CORRECT. 
24
 Q YES. IN OTHER WORDS, THE THING WOULD SMOKE, I 
25
 THINK AS YOU INDICATED TO MR. AND MRS. BECKSTEAD-PORTER IN 
) / / 335 
1 THE INTERVIEW, FOR HOURS AND HOURS AND HOURS AND HOURS? 
2I A CORRECT. 
3 . Q SO, IN OTHER WORDS, WHAT WE WOULD -- SO, YOU 
4
 I DISCOUNT THAT; RIGHT? 
5 A • 1 DISCOUNT --
6 | Q YOU DISCOUNT, I MEAN YOU DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY 
7 I THAT THAT OCCURRED, IN YOUR OPINION? 
8 I A THAT'S CORRECT. 
9 Q BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE A SITUATION 
10 WHERE IN YOUR OPINION IT WOULD GENERATE HEAT, GENERATE 
11 SMOKE? 
12 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
13 Q DID YOU EVER RUN ANY KIND OF TEST ON ANY OF THE 
14 MATERIAL, OFFICER? 
15 A ANY OF WHAT MATERIAL? 
16
 Q ANY OF THIS BED SHEET STUFF? 
17
 | A NO. 
18
 Q DID YOU EVER TAKE IT TO A CRIME LAB? 
19
 A NO. 
20
 Q DID YOU EVER SAY, "TEST IT"? 
21
 A NO. 
22
 Q DID YOU EVER SAY, "LOOK AT IT"? 
23
 I A N O . 
Q TELL ME --
A NO TESTS WERE RUN. 
24 
25 
Q NO TESTS AT ALL? 
A NONE AT ALL. 
Q YOU DIDN'T THINK THAT INFORMATION WAS IMPORTANT? 
A NO, I DIDN'T. 
Q YOU WOULDN'T WANT TO KNOW WHAT THEY HAD TO SAY? 
A NOT PARTICULARLY. HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE 
FIRE . 
Q IT WOULDN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE TO YOU, WOULD 
IT, OFFICER? 
A NO. 
Q BECAUSE ON NOVEMBER 4TH YOU FORMULATED YOUR 
OPINION; DIDN'T YOU? 
A AS A RESULT OF THE SCENE, I DID, YES. 
Q AND IT WOULDN'T MATTER WHAT ANY CRIME LAB MAY 
HAVE TOLD YOU, IS THAT RIGHT, IN YOUR MIND? 
A IF THEY WANTED TO SEND IT TO A CRIME LAB AND THE 
CRIME LAB HAD COME BACK WITH WHATEVER RESULTS, THEY WOULD 
HAVE, YES. 
Q NOW, THESE CRIME LABS, THEY'RE JUST FOLKS THAT 
WORK IN LABS, ARE THEY NOT? 
A THE CRIME LAB? 
Q YES, THE CRIME LAB. 
A THEY'RE PEOPLE THAT WORK THERE. 
Q AND THEY DO FIBER ANALYSIS? 
A YES. 
Q AND MICROSCOPIC EXAMINATIONS? 
A YES, THEY DO. 
Q DETERMINE WHAT KIND OF SUBSTANCE MAY BE ON THE 
IRON? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND THEY MAY DETERMINE THE BURNING AND SMOKING 
POINTS; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A I DON'T KNOW THAT THEY CAN DO THAT, NO. 
Q YOU DON'T KNOW? 
A I DON'T KNOW. 
Q EVEN THOUGH YOU DON'T KNOW, YOU DIDN'T THINK IT 
WAS IMPORTANT TO FIND OUT? 
A NO. 
Q AND YOU MADE NO EFFORTS TO TRY TO DETERMINE WHAT 
MAY CAUSE THIS DISCOLORATION ON THE IRON? 
A NO. 
Q OFFICER, WOULD YOU STEP DOWN HERE FOR JUST A 
MINUTE -- FAIRLY DISTINCT LINE. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q I WONDER IF YOU WOULD MIND PLACING THAT IRON 
RIGHT THERE. THANK YOU. 
TAKE A LOOK AT THE POSITION OF IT. 
A POSITION AS TO WHAT? 
Q AS TO THAT LINE. 
A APPROXIMATELY RIGHT THERE. 
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MR. BROWN: I WONDER IF IT WOULD BE PERMISSIBLE 
IF I COULD HAVE THE JURY LOOK AT WHERE HE HAS POSITIONED 
THE IRON. 
THE COURT: YOU MAY DO SO. I GUESS THEY CAN 
WALK AROUND WITHOUT FALLING. BE CAREFUL. HAVE ALL OF 
YOU HAD A CHANCE TO LOOK AT IT? 
(AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE FROM 
JURY PANEL.) 
Q (BY MR. BROWN) OFFICER, DID YOU ATTACH ANY 
SIGNIFICANCE AT ALL TO THE MELTING? 
A NO. 
Q NONE WHATSOEVER? 
A JUST THAT IT WAS DOWN. WE ASSUMED THAT IT WAS 
DOWN. 
Q YOU RELIED UPON MR. NORRIS, DID YOU NOT? 
A YES, WE DID. 
Q MR. NORRIS HAS IT LIKE THAT? 
A YES. 
Q OKAY. YOU CAN RESUME YOUR SEAT. 
IS MELTING, IF YOU POSITION THAT IRON, OFFICER, 
AND YOU POSITION IT MAYBE ON SOME CARPET MATERIAL AND YOU 
ASSUME THAT GRAVITY IS STILL IN OPERATION IN THE STATE OF 
UTAH --
A I WOULD ASSUME, YEAH. 
Q AND SO, IF THIS MATERIAL WAS GOING TO MELT, WHERE 
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1 IS IT GOING TO BE? 
2 A THE PLASTIC? 
3 Q THE PLASTIC. 
4 A THE PLASTIC WILL GO TO THE BOTTOM. 
5 Q AND IF YOU HAVE A SITUATION HERE — LET ME SHOW 
6 YOU THIS IRON HERE. YOU UNDERSTAND, OBVIOUSLY IT IS NOT 
7 EVEN MADE BY THE SAME COMPANY AS THIS, IS IT? 
8 I A WELL, AS I UNDERSTAND, IT'S MADE BY THE SAME 
9 COMPANY. THE COMPANY JUST CHANGED ITS NAME. 
10 Q BUT HERE, WE TAKE A LOOK AT THIS IRON. THIS IS 
11 AN ORDINARY IRON. THERE IS MOST OF THE PLASTIC, ISN'T 
12 THERE, RIGHT HERE? 
13 A I SAY THE PLASTIC IS PROBABLY MORE DENSE IN THE 
14 | BASE. 
15 Q BUT THERE'S QUITE A BIT OF PLASTIC HERE; ISN'T 
*6I THERE? WOULD THAT INDICATE ANYTHING TO YOU IN TERMS OF 
17I WHEN THIS THING HEATED UP AS TO WHETHER IT WAS LAYING FLAT 
OR POSITIONED AT AN ANGLE? 18 
19
 A NOT NECESSARILY 
20 !
 Q NOTHING AT ALL? 
21
 | A PLASTIC WILL BURN AND THEREFORE THE PLASTIC --
22
 " THAT MAY HAVE BEEN -- THE FRONT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN IN 
23 | EXISTENCE. 
24
 ' Q BUT THERE IS PLASTIC HERE AND IT SEEMS TO BE 
25 FLOWING THIS WAY, DOES IT NOT? 
Q YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT THEY USED? 
A NO. 
Q BUT, AT ANY RATE, THEY PUT ON WATER AND THEY 
PUT WATER ON HERE. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND, OFFICER, YOU ATTACH NO SIGNIFICANCE AT ALL 
TO THE CONFIGURATION OF THIS IRON? 
A TO THE CONFIGURATION OF THE IRON? 
Q YES. THE MATERIAL ON THE BACK, AND ALSO THIS. 
A NO. 
Q AS TO THE CAUSE OF THE FIRE OR AS TO THE POSITION 
OF THE IRON, AS TO THE TIME? 
A I DON'T UNDERSTAND YOUR QUESTION. 
Q AS TO THE POSITION OF THE IRON? ANY SIGNIFICANCE 
AS TO THE POSITION OF THE IRON? 
A NO. 
Q AS TO THE CAUSE OF THE FIRE? 
A AS TO THE CAUSE, NO. 
Q NO SIGNIFICANCE? 
A NO. 
Q AS TO THE TIME? 
A NO. 
Q NO SIGNIFICANCE? 
A NONE AT ALL. 
Q SO, NO SIGNIFICANCE? 
Q I TAKE IT YOU KIND OF FEEL LIKE YOU CAN DO 
EVERYTHING SORT OF IN-HOUSE WITH THIS CASE. 
A WITH THIS CASE, THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q YOU INDICATE, OFFICER, THAT MR. BECKSTEAD-PORTER 
WAS IN THE ROOM OF THE ORIGIN OF THE FIRE JUST PRIOR TO 
THE FIRE. 
A THAT IS CORRECT. 
Q AND, OFFICER, YOU BASED THAT ON AN UNRECORDED 
CONVERSATION YOU HAD WITH MR. BECKSTEAD-PORTER. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND, OF COURSE, THAT UNRECORDED CONVERSATION 
OCCURRED NOVEMBER 4? 
A THAT'S RIGHT. 
Q ALL RIGHT. AND YOU THEN HAVE A RECORDED 
CONVERSATION WITH MR. BECKSTEAD-PORTER, DO YOU NOT? 
A I DO. 
Q AND WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THAT RECORDED 
CONVERSATION? 
A I WANTED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE FIRE WAS AN ARSON 
FIRE, THAT IT WAS NOT AN ACCIDENTAL FIRE. 
Q OKAY. 
A I WANTED TO GET PERMISSION TO GO BACK TO THE 
HOUSE. 
Q DID YOU WANT TO ESTABLISH ANY FACTS? 
A SURE, WE DID. 
1 INTO THE SHEETS; IS THAT RIGHT? 
2 A I DON'T KNOW WHAT -- IF I COULD TELL YOU WHAT THE 
3 PROSECUTOR --
4
 Q I'M SURE 1 CAN'T EITHER. BUT HE REFERRED TO IT 
5 AND YOU ANSWERED. 
6 I A HE ASKED ME A QUESTION AND I ANSWERED IT. 
7 Q YOU SAID THAT IF VARIOUS THINGS CAME TO YOUR 
8 | ATTENTION YOU WOULD CORRECT YOUR REPORT, DID YOU NOT? 
9 A SURE. 
10 J Q IT CAME TO YOUR ATTENTION, DID IT NOT, DURING THE 
11 I COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION THAT THE IRON, IN FACT, WAS 
12 FOUND BENEATH BED SHEETS; DID IT NOT? 
13 A NO, IT DID NOT. 
14 Q IN OTHER WORDS, ANDREW GLAD NEVER TOLD YOU THAT? 
15 | A NO, HE NEVER DID. 
16
 I Q SO, THE ONLY INFORMATION YOU HAD WAS FROM TADD 
17 j NORR IS? 
i 
18
 J A THAT'S CORRECT. 
19
 I Q AND TADD NORRIS HAS GOT THE IRON UP HERE; IS THAT 
20 CORRECT? 
21 j A THAT'S CORRECT. 
22
 I Q AND THAT'S WHAT YOU'RE RELYING ON TO BASE YOUR 
23-J OPINION? 
2A
 | MR. MORGAN: YOUR HONOR, I HAVE A MOTION TO 
25
 | STRIKE. I HAVE NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER THAT ANDREW GLAD 
